How Should Taiwan Play the “Trump” Card?

Donald Trump¹ took office as the Forty-Seventh President of the United States on January 20, 2025. Before his inauguration, the world, learning from the unpredictability and transactional proclivity of Trump’s foreign policy during his first term, had expected an upside-down in US foreign policy and international relations after he assumed the presidency. Merely a few months into his second term, President Trump’s whirlwind of actions, from announcing reciprocal tariffs on imports from around the world to proposing to take control of the Panama Canal, Greenland, and Gaza, delivered that expectation.

Like the rest of the world, Taiwan warily watched the unfolding uncertainty of its sole security guarantor’s foreign policy. Taiwan’s critical importance to the US interests in East Asia is traditionally built upon three pillars. The first is Taiwan’s geographic location at the center of the First Island Chain, which serves the US geopolitical interests in strangling China’s military power projection in the Western Pacific. The second is the litmus-test role Taiwan’s autonomy from China plays in the credibility of the US security commitment to Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines that sustains the US alliance system in East Asia. The third is Taiwan’s democratic body politic, which shares the US values and interests in leading a liberal, rules-based international order. President Trump has shown his disregard for the value of democracy and US alliances, ripping his Taiwan policy off the stabilizing (and reassuring, from Taiwan’s perspective) constraints from principles and institutions. The significant weakening of two of the three pillars leaves the US Taiwan policy entirely to President Trump’s whim on managing America’s geopolitical competition with China. The high stakes and uncertainty have kept the island and its friends on edge.

Speculating about the future directions of the US-China geopolitical relations, Evan Medeiros, the Obama White House’s National Security Council Director for Asian Affairs, argued that much would depend on whether Trump the competitor or Trump the dealmaker will step forward.² What kind of a competitor would he be if Trump continues to view China as a geopolitical challenger and rival to the United States? Interestingly, David Lee, Taiwan’s former Secretary-General of President Tsai Ing-wen’s National Security Council, recommended people in Taiwan review the American classic film The Godfather. Which character in The Godfather³ will Trump the competitor play?

Trump the Competitor

Trump certainly is not playing the role of the old Don, Vito Corleone. President Trump faces a world that is moving from a unipolar US hegemony to multipolarity. From new international organizations, such as BRICS that can rule out the United States, to new interstate wars, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine that can break out and drag on despite US warnings , counteractions, and President Trump’s threats of punishment, the time that the United States can single-handedly dictate the world has gone. The circumstances that President Trump faces are similar to the crumbling hegemony that the Corleone family faces after Don Vito Corleone is gunned down on the street. The tasks faced by President Trump are similar to those faced by Vito’s heirs: To maintain US influence, interests, and position as the first among equals in a multipolarizing world. To that end, will Trump be Tom Hagen, Vito Corleone’s adopted son, who hopes to return to the alignments and US-led international rules in the old days through dialogues? Will Trump be Sonny Corleone, Vito’s eldest son, who only knows assertiveness and coercion, including the reflexive use of force? Or, will Trump be Michael Corleone, Vito’s youngest son, who knows that sticks and carrots are both necessary for and more effective with a position of strength?⁴

Trump apparently is not Tom Hagen. His threat to discard allies (in the campaign trail, he said he would not protect North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies who did not meet the two percent of gross domestic production (GDP) military budget target) and his executive order withdrawing the United States from the World Health Organization (WTO) show that he is not keen on dialogues, alliances, and the extant US-led order.

Fortunately, President Trump seems to enjoy a moment to deal with America’s geopolitical challenges from a position of strength. In contrast to America’s vibrant economy and robust military capabilities witnessed in the recent battlefields in Ukraine and the Middle East, America’s geopolitical rivals, the so-called “Axis of Upheaval” countries, are facing difficulties—China’s economic slowdown, Russia’s war quagmire, North Korea’s chronicle deprivation, and Iran’s Potemkin strength exposed by Israel’s military operations. Trump also benefits from the “madman” image he acquired during his first term.⁵ Notwithstanding the TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out) derision, he remains perceived as unpredictable and “crazy,” willing to carry out destructive actions even if suffering self-inflicted wounds. After all, TACO or not, his Liberation Day tariffs have implemented a baseline 10% tariff on all trading partners, including economic behemoths such as China and the European Union (EU), despite overwhelming warnings on the negative consequences for the US economy. As a result, no one, friends or foes, can discard his threats lightly. The perception makes America’s rivals more likely to be deterred, an apparent reason behind the Japanese political commentator Akio Taita’s assertion, “I don’t know whether Trump was a madman, but when he was in power, madmen around the world all behaved well.”⁶

The problem is that Trump also threatens allies and friends, making people uncertain whether he is Sonny Corleone the reckless or Michael Corleone the shrewd. The latter’s savvy use of coercion and inducement would create and maintain the free world’s position of strength relative to the Axis of Upheaval in the destabilizing process of multi-polarization. In contrast, the former’s reckless use of coercion would lead the free-world alliances to crumble and precipitate America’s decline, wreaking direct or collateral havoc to Taiwan, which increasingly relies on the solidarity of the free world to maintain deterrence against China.

Taking Trump Seriously, Not Literally?

President Trump’s controversial offer to purchase Greenland, an autonomous territory of America’s NATO ally Denmark, and threats to take control of the Panama Canal, with force if necessary, where the country’s current government is deemed “pro-America,” exacerbate the uncertainty. What do these two incidents reveal about America’s foreign policy under Trump 2.0?

Behind Trump’s hyperbolic gestures, one could still discern solid geopolitical concerns linked to America’s national security. Greenland is located at the geographic point where North America and Europe are closest to each other, similar to Alaska’s location as the closest point between North America and Asia. Greenland and Alaska also control the entrances to the Arctic routes that have become increasingly accessible due to global warming and are the shortest routes where the United States might meet Russian security menaces. However, Trump’s interests in Greenland go beyond concerns over Russia.

China proclaimed itself a “near-Arctic state” and has actively involved itself in Arctic affairs through investments in Greenland and explorations by Chinese icebreakers. Chinese and Russian bombers have conducted joint flights in the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The two coast guards have conducted joint patrols in the Bering Sea near Alaska. Moreover, the Arctic routes give China and Russia ideal sea lanes to operate submarines and threaten US national security.

On the other hand, the shipping lanes through the Panama Canal are the shortest distance connecting America’s east and west coasts and the shortest routes to deploy the US Atlantic fleet to the Pacific and vice versa. The United States is also the biggest user of the canal. However, the ports at the canal’s two ends are currently operated by a Hong Kongese company. The Trump Administration’s officials have sounded alarm that China could deny US access to the canal when the two countries are engulfed in a conflict.⁷ Trump himself has repeated several times that the United States gave the canal to Panama, not China.⁸

President Trump’s hyperbolic threats to control Greenland and the Panama Canal are consistent with his proclivity for transactional foreign policy to pursue US geopolitical interests. Since the United States has more leverage than Denmark or Panama has, Copenhagen’s and Panama City’s responses to the issues that Trump raises must meet Washington’s demands. One can expect Trump to push, push, and push to align the two countries’ offers as close as possible to America’s preferences. It would be ideal if Denmark and Panama could take matters into their own hands and satisfy Trump. However, they should not blame the United States for presumption if they could not. Furthermore, Trump’s transactional approach means no one should expect a free lunch. Trump downplays alliances (Demark is a NATO ally), collective security, and rules-based international order, meaning he is not interested in playing the role of the world’s policeman. Nor is he interested in providing global public goods that others can freeride. Instead, any country needing America to lend a hand or forcing America’s hand must pay.

Taiwan should feel relieved by how Trump links Sino-US geopolitical competition to the US national security interests mentioned above. America’s gestures might indicate it is Trump the competitor that steps forward. With the help of seasoned foreign policy aides, including National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Trump’s hyperbole of using force against Greenland or Panama will not happen. His startling threats are likely ways to highlight his seriousness about the matters and keep pushing counterparts, friends or foes, to make as many concessions as possible. If this is true, Trump looks like Michael Corleone the shrewd, who knows how to enter negotiations with a position of strength to pursue America’s geopolitical advantages.

However, it remains to be seen whether President Trump will avoid returning to Sonny Corleone’s impulse of reckless unilateralism and coercion, including against America’s allies and friends. His highhanded ways in tariff negotiations with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and the EU risk making them have nothing to show in return for their alliances with the United States and leading to the collapse of America’s bandwagon. Trump the shrewd will know that coercion is only a means to acquire strength in negotiation and that loyal allies are fundamental to US strength in competition against geopolitical foes. The wisdom is especially essential in a world that America no longer dominates.

Trump the Dealmaker

If it were Trump the dealmaker that steps forward to manage America’s geopolitical relations with China, Taiwan will face daunting uncertainty and risk that the island has very little in control to hedge against. Nonetheless, Trump states in his biography that he loves making deals and focuses on having leverage in negotiation. Trump puts leverage concisely as “having something the other guy wants. Or better yet, needs. Or best of all, simply can’t do without.”⁹ He also loves to pursue monumental deals and ask sky-high prices to push up counter offers. Given Taiwan’s critical geostrategic location mentioned earlier and its semiconductor industry’s essential role in the technological competition between China and the United States, the island is the leverage that Trump loathes to lose in dealing with Xi Jinping. Under his “Make America Great Again (MAGA)” agenda, Trump’s preferred deal and asking price might not be short of reasserting America’s dominance, influence, and interests in the international system. It is reasonable to doubt whether the price will be a China boasting about the East’s rise and the West’s demise while facing daunting domestic economic challenges willing to pay.

Playing the Trump Card

Facing the unpredictable Trump 2.0, Taiwan’s best strategy is to focus on things it can control. Trump demands fair burden-sharing in security relations, and during his campaign, he even accused Taiwan of not paying the United States enough for defense.¹⁰ Therefore, Taiwan should shoulder the cost and beef up its own defense capabilities, making the island a geopolitical asset from Trump’s perspective instead of a country shirking its responsibility and freeriding on America. Investing in defense should be a relatively easy decision for the island as such measures kill several birds with one stone—it enhances Taiwan’s deterrence against China’s pacing security threat while making Trump feel he already wins by pushing Taiwan into action to meet his demands. Taiwan’s President William Lai has made a good start by announcing the government’s plan to use special budgets to increase defense spending to three percent of GDP. However, it remains to be seen whether he could forge a consensus with the opposition parties to sustain the efforts and even increase further when Trump demands more.

Secondly, Taiwan should avoid being seen by the Trump Administration as a disloyal ally. Amid fierce geopolitical competition, no country could afford to support unreliable allies, which is tantamount to wasting resources. Noncommittal alignments would be especially repugnant to Trump, who emphasizes loyalty and focuses on containing the costs. Here again, President Lai is moving in the right direction by proposing Taiwan as a cornerstone member in a global non-red (i.e., non-China) supply chain. Lastly, as Secretary-General David Lee advised, Taiwan must also avoid being seen as the provoking side in the Taiwan Strait and driving Trump’s negative cost-benefit calculations. If Taiwan rides the coattails of Trump’s geopolitical containment of China, the island is naturally an asset instead of a disposable pawn of the United States. In contrast, if Trump feels he is forced to clean up Taiwan’s mess in the Taiwan Strait, his cost-benefit calculation might reverse to the detriment of the island.

To conclude, Taiwan’s bottom-line strategy in Trump 2.0 is to take a page from his The Art of the Deal: Enhancing the island’s position in any exchanges by controlling things that others want, need, or can’t do without. Taiwan needs a clear-headed understanding of its leverage in potential scenarios. Taiwan needs to think ahead and avoid going to the negotiating table without leverage. Taiwan also needs to avoid giving up its leverage that others can’t do without in any exchanges. However, the fundamental source of leverage comes from continuing to invest and build up the island’s capabilities; as the saying goes, God helps those who help themselves. Keeping these principles in mind, Taiwan will be more likely to have a “trump card” to play, no matter whether it is Trump the competitor or the dealmaker that steps forward.