{"id":6063,"date":"2022-09-27T09:39:02","date_gmt":"2022-09-27T13:39:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/?p=6063"},"modified":"2023-04-07T09:10:34","modified_gmt":"2023-04-07T13:10:34","slug":"helping-china-learn-the-putin-lesson","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/2022\/china-currents\/21-3\/helping-china-learn-the-putin-lesson\/","title":{"rendered":"Helping China Learn the Putin Lesson"},"content":{"rendered":"
Seven months into Vladimir Putin\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, the consequences of the war remain unclear. Russia might regain the upper hand or be forced off Ukrainian soil. No less certain is the length and intensity of Russia\u2019s status as a pariah state. For the future of the Republic of China (ROC \u2013 Taiwan) and the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC \u2013 the mainland), however, the international community must make Russia feel the consequences of its actions as acutely as possible. This should especially come in the form of economic and cultural sanctions that would most worry the PRC, particularly its leaders, and thereby dissuade Xi Jinping from launching an invasion of Taiwan. Long term, it might demonstrate to China\u2019s top leaders, as well as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and country more broadly, the danger of a leader whose power remains unchecked for too long.<\/p>\n
There is a strong case for making Russia an example for other countries wanting to settle real or imagined territorial disputes through force. If Russia can keep territorial gains, negotiate a peace, and re-enter the world relatively quickly, possible belligerents will draw the conclusion that they can do the same. If lifting sanctions on Russia is the price of peace, then countries must do so at Ukraine\u2019s request. Regardless, they should use whatever tools of diplomacy available to them to make a lasting impression that Russia, and particularly its high-ranking leaders, will pay a price indefinitely.<\/p>\n
China has probably already drawn military lessons from Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine and its consequences. It is difficult to know how these will impact its estimates of the United States\u2019 appetite to defend Taiwan, the island\u2019s military capabilities, rich democracies’ stomach for prolonged economic sanctions, or the PRC\u2019s ability to weather them. There is only so much the international response to Russia can do to impact these calculations. What Chinese leaders must become convinced of, however, is that the diplomatic and political costs of an invasion of Taiwan are not worth it. If Russians have trouble getting visas for holidays to France and athletes are kept out of Wimbledon, it could help make an invasion look unappealing to China, especially for a regime that has staked its legitimacy on making China strong and respected abroad. There are signs Russian elites are beginning to criticize the war, yet Putin, like Xi, seems to have retained sufficient popular and elite support thus far. The sting of sanctions will need to prove stronger and longer-lasting if they are really to be an example.<\/p>\n
The Russian example should show top Chinese leaders that if China invades Taiwan their foreign assets will be seized, and their children would no longer be welcome in world\u2019s top universities. Ideally, examples of measures that would specifically target and hurt top Chinese leaders should go beyond simply disincentivizing an attack on Taiwan and should make China\u2019s leadership think twice about how long they want Xi\u2019s rule to continue unchecked.<\/p>\n
Born eight months apart in the world\u2019s two largest Communist countries, the similarities between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are notable. There were, however, profound differences between the countries they inherited from their predecessors. Despite a constitutional crisis, likely election fraud, and massive political influence from oligarchs, Russia in 1999 was relatively freer and more democratic. Its post-Soviet political structure had yet to be institutionalized and it was struggling to find its economic footing after a decade of decline. In contrast, 2012 China was much less free and democratic, but had institutionalized a regular transfer of power and engineered 25 years of near 10% growth. Despite these differences, Xi and Putin\u2019s rule mark the beginnings of periods of repression. Figure 1 demonstrates this as the Varieties of Democracy Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index shows marked declines starting when Putin and Xi take power in their respective countries. While the decline under Putin is more dramatic, as Russia had further to fall, it is notable that the trend continues largely unabated in both countries.<\/p>\n
Figure 1: Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index for Russia for Russia and China 1980-2021<\/p>\n