{"id":5901,"date":"2022-03-31T15:27:32","date_gmt":"2022-03-31T19:27:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/?p=5901"},"modified":"2023-04-07T09:14:08","modified_gmt":"2023-04-07T13:14:08","slug":"chinas-nina-andreeva-moment","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/2022\/china-currents\/21-1\/chinas-nina-andreeva-moment\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s Nina Andreeva Moment"},"content":{"rendered":"

On March 13, 1988, at the height of Gorbachev\u2019s glasnost\u2019 policy, an elderly teacher from Leningrad named Nina Andreeva published a letter in a conservative (i.e. anti-perestroika) Russian newspaper, defending traditional Soviet, indeed Stalinist, values against Gorbachev\u2019s perestroika program.[1]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 The article\u2019s tenor was harsh, authoritarian, and chauvinist.\u00a0 Three weeks later, on April 5, Pravda published an authoritative rebuttal of Andreeva\u2019s letter strongly defending Gorbachev\u2019s perestroika policy.\u00a0 However, during the interval between Andreeva\u2019s letter and Pravda\u2019s response, many other publications, unsure of what the official line now was, reprinted her letter.\u00a0 Liberal intellectuals were alarmed by the affair; anti-reform intellectuals took comfort from discovering that they had high-level support.\u00a0 Gorbachev\u2019s reform policies triggered significant ideological conflict at the top levels of leadership, and glasnost\u2019 let it be exposed in public.\u00a0 Glasnost\u2019 \u2014 the loosening of ideological control over public communications \u2014 had made it difficult for party leaders to rein in significant disagreement with Gorbachev\u2019s reform policies.\u00a0 The loss of clear central guidance left editors at a loss to know how to handle dissenting opinion that strayed well outside formerly accepted boundaries of debate.[2]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 In a polity where ideological and political power are intertwined, a phase of significant policy change creates confusion for the curators of public communication.\u00a0 They dare not move too far ahead of the leaders, but they also must demonstrate loyalty to the general direction of change.<\/p>\n

A similar episode occurred in China in 2021.\u00a0 A writer named Li Guangman, formerly editor of a trade publication for an electric power company and columnist for a website that no longer exists, posted a long commentary called \u201cEveryone Can Sense that a Profound Transformation is Underway!\u201d to his WeChat account in late August.\u00a0 Several media outlets immediately republished his essay, among them People\u2019s Daily and Xinhua \u2014 two of the leading central-level news platforms in the country.<\/p>\n

The tone and content of Li\u2019s post echoed the militant rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution.\u00a0 After a lengthy diatribe against a few pop culture celebrities who had been canceled over tax evasion and offenses against traditional cultural values, Li noted other recent regime moves including the suspension of the IPO by Alibaba\u2019s digital finance spin-off Ant Group, the new emphasis on the theme of \u201ccommon prosperity,\u201d and the grand celebrations of the Party\u2019s centenary.\u00a0 All these actions, he claimed, signaled the coming of a \u201cprofound revolution\u201d that would sweep away \u201ccapitalist cliques\u201d and bring the \u201cpeople\u201d back to the forefront of society.\u00a0 In dramatic Maoist fashion, he celebrated \u201cthe return of red, the return to heroes, the return of blood\u201d (hongse huigui, yingxiong huigui, xiexing huigui<\/em>).\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 Like Mao and the Gang of Four, Li demanded thorough going cultural change. \u201cWe need to control all the cultural chaos and build a lively, healthy, masculine, strong, and people-oriented culture\u201d (\u201cwomen xuyao zhili yiqie wenhua luan xiang, jianshe xian huo, jiankang, yanggang, quianghan, yi renmin wei de wenhua<\/em>\u201d), Li said.[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Four days later, the editor of the aggressively pro-regime, anti-Western publication, Global Times, Hu Xijin, published a rebuttal of Li\u2019s post.[4]<\/sup><\/a> Calling Li\u2019s article misleading and inaccurate, Hu declared that China\u2019s leaders had been following an orderly course of measures aimed at preserving the \u201creform and opening up\u201d mixed economy model \u2014 which did not at all amount to a revolution.\u00a0 Hu particularly objected to the rhetorical tone, which he said \u201cwould evoke some historic memories and trigger chaos in minds and panic among people.\u201d[5]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Rather than publishing it in Global Times, however, he posted it to his personal blog.\u00a0 Then the censors ordered that the post was not to be shared on Weibo or WeChat.\u00a0 Several hours later, the ban was lifted, and the post could be shared again.\u00a0Reports from media sources indicate that the regulators issued oral instructions to media editors acknowledging that Li\u2019s post had a wider impact than they had anticipated.\u00a0 Rather than demanding that they rescind or refute it, however, they asked editors to balance it with less inflammatory content.[6]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 After that, the controversy subsided.\u00a0 Li Guangman continued to post content, but less heated. The leadership made it clear that they would continue to intensify restrictions against Western influences and press the common prosperity theme, but not shutter all large private businesses or enact draconian redistributive policies.<\/p>\n

Like the Nina Andreeva affair, the Li Guangman episode revealed two things about the current state of Chinese policymaking.\u00a0 Most obvious is the ambiguity in policy about how much the state intends to balance market activity and private capital ownership with state control.\u00a0 Second, at a deeper level, that ambiguity indicates divergence in the positions of key players in the policymaking process over basic economic policy choices.\u00a0 There is a basic tension between Xi Jinping\u2019s need for supreme leadership and the fact that the regime rests on a series of tacit understandings among powerful bureaucratic and business interests.\u00a0 A good indication of this is the incoherence intrinsic to the \u201ccommon prosperity\u201d slogan.\u00a0 There is a widespread expert consensus around concern over high inequality and the need to build a middle-class society, one where the middle-income strata are the dominant force in society. One recent commentary notes that China\u2019s society is about 30 percent middle class and argues that China can improve economic and social stability by raising that proportion to two-thirds.[7]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 However, the leadership has consistently avoided acknowledging the extreme concentration of income at the upper end.\u00a0 Instead, it has consistently asserted the need to raise low-end incomes through measures such as a higher minimum wage and more effective social assistance programs.\u00a0 Despite the conspicuous assaults on a few visible tycoons and celebrities, even in the most recent phase, the leaders have been cautious about arguing for an effective progressive income tax system, an estate tax, or surtaxes on high incomes.\u00a0 The regime is moving extremely cautiously in introducing a property tax, for instance, authorizing only small-scale local experiments.<\/p>\n

An example of current mainstream thinking on the issue of inequality is an essay co-authored by the prominent economist and expert on inequality, Li Shi, dean of the Institute on Sharing and Development (gong xiang yu fazhan<\/em>), at Zhejiang University and an associate at the institute, Yang Yixin.[8]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 The essay discusses Zhejiang Province\u2019s pilot program to build \u201ccommon prosperity.\u201d While using the standard image of an \u201colive-shaped society\u201d \u2014 the model of a social structure that is thickest in the middle and thinner at the two ends \u2014 the essay is anything but radical.\u00a0 It does propose taxes on wealth, such as estates and real estate, but only in the course of time.\u00a0 The authors do not argue for a progressive income tax.\u00a0 They call for \u201chigh-quality development\u201d that expands incomes in the middle, but their only concrete prescriptions promise more \u201cdigitalization\u201d and the \u201csharing economy.\u201d\u00a0 They want to build middle class wealth by making sophisticated new financial products more widely available, assuming that more financial sophistication would spur economic growth.\u00a0 They want to reduce the incomes at the top by encouraging more charitable donations (i.e. \u201ctertiary distribution\u201d) but do not propose using the tax code to create incentives for that purpose.\u00a0 They call for extending social rights to migrant workers, but only gradually, and without hukou<\/em>reform.\u00a0 They call for the use of \u201ccollective consultation\u201d (xie shang<\/em>) rather than collective bargaining between organized labor and employers over wages.[9]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Most of the calls for improved workers\u2019 wages, in fact, have to do with incentive pay rather than base pay.\u00a0 Are these as far as the writers can go?\u00a0 Or are these progressive-minded economists so fearful of the Maoists that they think they must guard against any serious shifts in social or fiscal policy?\u00a0 Substantively, the essay reveals policy experts\u2019 reluctance to discuss the many forms of rent extraction that a state-dominated, cronyistic economy permits, the ways in which income rents support the Party\u2019s political monopoly, and the forms of privilege that prevent real mobility of capital or labor across sectors and regions.\u00a0 They bind the regime\u2019s political elites with businesspeople, state and private, who generate the rents the Party uses to maintain its power.\u00a0 Little wonder that serious reform-minded economists stop well short of analyzing the political economy of the regime.<\/p>\n

At present, policymakers are working to deflect the \u201ccommon prosperity\u201d initiative into politically policy concepts.[10]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 A visible example is the idea of \u201ctertiary distribution.\u201d[11]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 In Chinese parlance, primary distribution is the result of the marketplace, where contributions to production determine the returns to labor and capital.\u00a0 Secondary distribution occurs through redistributive mechanisms, specifically taxes, social insurance contributions and benefits, and social transfers.\u00a0 Tertiary distribution \u2014 the channel that the current policy emphasizes as the way to achieve \u201ccommon prosperity\u201d \u2014 is voluntary donations of money and time to the nonprofit sector.\u00a0 Experts are calling for a reform of the tax code to provide material incentives through tax deductions for such contributions.\u00a0 However, given the current political climate, many wealthy individuals have found it expedient to make sizable and well-publicized donations to worthy causes.\u00a0 Lacking in the current debate is a reconsideration of more basic economic and political institutions that have fostered cronyistic and corrupt exchanges of benefits between wealthy entrepreneurs and political officials.<\/p>\n

Therefore, when we interpret Xi\u2019s gestures against Westernized entertainment industry stars, the private tutoring industry, and \u2014selectively \u2014 against big digital platform companies as a broad \u201ccrackdown on everything,\u201d[12]<\/sup><\/a> we overlook the fact that this is a highly selective and politically motivated campaign.\u00a0 Because regionalism, cronyism, and corruption are so deeply interconnected, enabling tycoons to amass wealth and power by cultivating mutually beneficial ties with local officials, it makes political sense for Xi to single out Jack Ma’s Zhijiang-based business empire and the regional officials who were closely tied to him: the campaign strikes at all three problems at the same time.[13]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The calls for \u201ccommon prosperity\u201d therefore reveal the limits on policy choices available to Xi.\u00a0 These are grounded in the multiple compromises his regime must make to retain power, between the monopoly of an ideologically driven communist party and its dependence on an economy dominated by politically favored state and private companies that feed the regime with taxes, kickbacks and privileged ownership shares.\u00a0 The leaders seek to respond to rising awareness of the extreme economic inequality in the country by taking measures to curb the excesses associated with particular firms and sectors, and by reaffirming Communist values.\u00a0 At the same time, they dare not move too far toward policies that would seriously harm the interests of the richest strata of entrepreneurs and managers who have locked in their advantageous positions by cultivating the favor of politicians at the local and national levels.\u00a0 Little wonder that new leftists are seizing on the opportunity to press for a radical turn away from the partial reform economy back toward Maoism, or that establishment party leaders and experts find it necessary to warn against any substantial steps toward a more far-reaching redistribution of wealth.\u00a0 In a polity where ideology and power are intertwined, the deepening of contradictions between the avowed doctrines of the regime and the actual institutions and practices its power rests on results in a gulf no amount of central control can bridge.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/sup><\/a> Nina Andreeva, \u201cNe mogu postupit\u2019sia princtsipami,\u201d [I cannot violate my principles] [https:\/\/diletant.media\/articles\/34848945\/]\n

[2]<\/sup><\/a> Thomas F. Remington, \u201cA Socialist Pluralism of Opinions: Glasnost and Policy-Making under Gorbachev\u201d, The Russian Review<\/em> 48: 3 (1989), pp. 271-304.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/sup><\/a> [http:\/\/www.xinhuanet.com\/politics\/2021-08\/29\/c_1127807097.htm]\u00a0 The reference to masculine cultural imagery alludes to the frequent complaint that the prominence of androgynous styles of self-presentation (sometimes called \u201csissy-boy\u201d styles [jingzhunan or simply jingnan, ie refined pig boys or refined boys] on the part of some male entertainment industry figures.\u00a0 This fad became the target of heated cultural criticism in recent years for its violation of traditional gender role stereotypes.\u00a0 Under the current crackdown, commercial ads and television programs may not use such images.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/sup><\/a> https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/politics\/article\/3147548\/viral-blogger-hailed-chinas-profound-revolution-state-may<\/a>; https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/articles\/chinese-essayist-revives-worries-about-a-new-cultural-revolution-11630670154<\/a>;<\/p>\n

[5]<\/sup><\/a> https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/politics\/article\/3147548\/viral-blogger-hailed-chinas-profound-revolution-state-may<\/a>; https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/articles\/chinese-essayist-revives-worries-about-a-new-cultural-revolution-11630670154.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/sup><\/a> https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/politics\/article\/3147548\/viral-blogger-hailed-chinas-profound-revolution-state-may.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/sup><\/a> Zhang Jun, \u201cGong fu hui xiaochu shouru chabie, dan ke baozhang diceng timian shenghuo,\u201d\u00a0 [https:\/\/fddi.fudan.edu.cn\/15\/20\/c18965a398624\/page.htm#:~:text=8%E6%9C%8817%E6%97%A5%E5%8F%AC%E5%BC%80,%E7%9A%84%E6%A9%84%E6%A6%84%E5%9E%8B%E5%88%86%E9%85%8D%E7%BB%93%E6%9E%84%E3%80%82&text=%E5%85%B1%E5%90%8C%E5%AF%8C%E8%A3%95%E6%98%AF%E5%90%A6%E5%B0%B1%E6%98%AF%E6%B6%88%E9%99%A4%E6%94%B6%E5%85%A5%E5%B7%AE%E5%88%AB%EF%BC%9F]\n

[8]<\/sup><\/a> Li Shi and Yang Yixin, \u201cJianshe shouru fenpei zhidu gaige shiyan qu zhu tui gongtong fuyu\u201d [\u201cEstablish reform of the income distribution system by a pilot zone for common prosperity\u201d][http:\/\/www.ce.cn\/xwzx\/gnsz\/gdxw\/202108\/19\/t20210819_36821588.shtml] August 19, 2021<\/p>\n

[9]<\/sup><\/a> On this distinction, see Thomas F. Remington and Cui Xiaowen, “The Impact of the 2008 Labor Contract Law on Labor Disputes in China,\u201d Journal of East Asian Studies<\/em> 15:2 (2015), p. 280.<\/p>\n

[10]<\/sup><\/a> For example, see the spate of articles in Caixin Global explaining that \u201ccommon prosperity\u201d does not mean \u201crobbing the rich to give to the poor\u201d and that it is an encouragement to more \u201ctertiary distribution.\u201d\u00a0 For example, Cai Xuejiao, \u201c\u2019Robbing the Rich\u2019 Is Not Part of China\u2019s Plan for \u2018Common Prosperity,\u2019 Official Says,\u201d Caixin Global<\/em>, August 26, 2021; Wang Tao, \u201cWhat Does \u2018Common Prosperity\u2019 Mean for China\u2019s Policies and Economy?\u201d Caixin Global<\/em>, August 27, 2021.<\/p>\n

[11]<\/sup><\/a> Eg. Kevin Guo, \u201cCX Daily: What\u2019s Standing in the Way of \u2018Common Prosperity\u2019?\u201d Caixin Global<\/em>, September 10, 2021 [https:\/\/www.caixinglobal.com\/2021-09-10\/cx-daily-whats-standing-in-the-way-of-common-prosperity-101771292.html]; Caixin Global, \u201cEditorial: Releasing the Potential of Tertiary Distribution,\u201d Caixin Global, August 23, 2021 [https:\/\/advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu\/document\/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=3b2d80b9-253e-4bf0-a656-90ef416dd531&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A63F7-M2R1-DY28-G00P-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=468180&pdteaserkey=sr9&pditab=allpods&ecomp=nzvnk&earg=sr9&prid=3c59210a-fdc4-4d3a-95cb-a8fd4011aafc]\n

[12]<\/sup><\/a> Lily Kuo, \u201cXi Jinping\u2019s Crackdown on Everything Is Remaking Chinese Society,\u201d Washington Post<\/em>, September 10, 2021.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/sup><\/a> Lizzi C. Lee, \u201cXi Jinping\u2019s Graft Busters Are Probing Jack Ma\u2019s Home City, and a Rising Star of Xi\u2019s Zhejiang Clan,\u201d SupChina, August 31, 2021 [https:\/\/supchina.com\/2021\/08\/31\/xi-jinpings-graft-busters-are-probing-jack-mas-home-city-and-a-rising-star-of-xis-zhejiang-clan\/]\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On March 13, 1988, at the height of Gorbachev\u2019s glasnost\u2019 policy, an elderly teacher from Leningrad named Nina Andreeva published a letter in a conservative (i.e. anti-perestroika) Russian newspaper, defending…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":92,"featured_media":5902,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1000],"tags":[275,1009],"topic":[1055,1056,1058,1059],"journal-year":[1066],"coauthors":[1005],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nChina\u2019s Nina Andreeva Moment | China Research Center<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/2022\/china_currents\/21-1\/chinas-nina-andreeva-moment\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"China\u2019s Nina Andreeva Moment | China Research Center\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"On March 13, 1988, at the height of Gorbachev\u2019s glasnost\u2019 policy, an elderly teacher from Leningrad named Nina Andreeva published a letter in a conservative (i.e. anti-perestroika) Russian newspaper, defending...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/2022\/china_currents\/21-1\/chinas-nina-andreeva-moment\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"China Research Center\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/chinaresearchcenter\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2022-03-31T19:27:32+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-04-07T13:14:08+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/moscow.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1281\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"1920\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Thomas F. 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