{"id":4690,"date":"2016-06-10T16:59:13","date_gmt":"2016-06-10T20:59:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/?p=4690"},"modified":"2023-04-07T11:12:29","modified_gmt":"2023-04-07T15:12:29","slug":"xi-jinpings-soft-power-martial-arts-cultural-trope","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/2016\/china-currents\/15-2\/xi-jinpings-soft-power-martial-arts-cultural-trope\/","title":{"rendered":"Xi Jinping\u2019s Soft Power Martial Arts Cultural Trope"},"content":{"rendered":"

Rap propaganda is the latest manifestation of Chinese President Xi Jinping\u2019s campaign to consolidate power using soft culture tropes to massage his image with audiences in China. Early in 2016, an official rap cartoon was circulated extolling the virtues of the \u201cFour Comprehensives. 1<\/a><\/sup> The effect of such subtle propaganda, if it can be called subtle, is confirmed in further reports:<\/p>\n

\u2026 a propaganda official from China’s Inner Mongolia region offered dubious praise [for the rap propaganda], calling the song \u201cbewitching and brainwashing.\u201d What pleased him most, Li said, was that final sentiment, when commenters say they could not get the song out of their heads, or that they sometimes found themselves involuntarily humming it. 2<\/a><\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The same article cites statistics asserting the video \u201chas attracted 70 million views and appeared on thousands of online accounts.\u201d Involuntarily humming the song demonstrates the power of an \u201cear worm,\u201d a song you can\u2019t get out of your head, and is an example of the power of culture to captivate people\u2019s minds, and maybe even hearts, for better or worse.<\/p>\n

Soft power exercised through such cultural tropes provides straightforward, but simultaneously ironic and humorous opportunities for cultural and political analysis.\u00a0 An earlier example of this is President Xi Jinping\u2019s state visit to Mongolia from August 21-22, 2014, during which he and Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj are pictured with bows and arrows in hand (see below):<\/p>\n

\"Xi<\/p>\n

“Mongolia treats Chinese president with traditional pageant”<\/em> 3<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

This weapon-laden photo op is the third of three pictures accompanying the English report \u2014 the picture was also circulated in Chinese media \u2014 which describes the occasion as a Nadam Fair specially arranged for the visiting dignitaries. Events included \u201cperformances of wrestling, horse racing, archery, and dancing.\u201d This was the \u201ccultural\u201d dimension of the summit, which had other serious business. The Xinhua report accompanying the slide states:<\/p>\n

During the visit, the leaders of the two countries announced the upgrading of their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership, and pledged to almost double their annual trade to 10 billion U.S. dollars by 2020. 4<\/a><\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This amounts to the promotion of China\u2019s sphere of influence as a \u201ccomprehensive strategic partnership\u201d involving mutually beneficial business, couched within the engagement of leaders in seemingly less serious \u201ccultural\u201d exchange. Such cultural trappings may be interpreted as the froth of more serious diplomatic engagement, but on a deeper semiotic level, it functions to key readers to a narrative latent with symbolic importance.<\/p>\n

In the current context of Xi Jinping\u2019s recent drive to use pop culture to promote his \u201cFour Comprehensives,\u201d the secondary objective of the campaign is to raise the president\u2019s profile and thus contribute to his accumulation of cultural capital. The archery picture at the Sino-Mongolian summit in August 2014 was taken a year-and-a-half before the current Spring 2016 campaign. Looking back, it appears the soft power campaign started long before the current employment of rap propaganda. The archery picture can be read as a metaphor, a reenactment of a symbol of ethnic nationalism and inter-ethnic cooperation and brotherhood, reprising the myth of martial arts hero Guo Jing, the main character in Jin Yong’s famous epic novel, The Eagle-Shooting Heroes<\/em> [She diao yingxiong zhuan<\/em>] \u5c04\u96d5\u82f1\u96c4\u4f20 (English title from the 1987 Yuanliu Publishing collected works edition, Taiwan).<\/p>\n

Compare the picture of Xi Jinping with bow and arrow in hand to the DVD and television series covers below (or in the web links):<\/p>\n

\"Bow<\/p>\n

The various English titles of the novel and multiple television series adaptations laud the shooter as \u201chero\u201d or refer to \u201cbravery,\u201d a reasonable translation of the Chinese, in which \u201chero\u201d appears in the title and \u201cbravery\u201d applies to the protagonist\u2019s character. The cultural symbolism of the \u201ceagle shooting pose\u201d that Xi adopted for the Sino-Mongolian Summit camera can be read as directly referring to the famous scene from the novel and film\/television depictions where protagonist Guo Jing proves himself worthy of Genghis Khan\u2019s notice through his archery by shooting eagles (or condors, depending on the choice of translation) out of the sky on a hunting trip. A short list of television and film adaptations of this novel includes: The Legend of the Condor Heroes<\/a> (TVB 1983), The Brave Archer<\/a> (Shaw Brothers 1977), The Legend of the Condor Heroes<\/a> (Tai Seng 1994), The Eagle-Shooting Heroes<\/a> (2008).<\/p>\n

Why might Xi Jinping want to identify himself with Guo Jing? The answer may be found in Guo\u2019s character, specifically the kind of hero he is:<\/p>\n

[Guo Jing\u2019s] most outstanding trait is his constant strife for moral rectitude, as seen when he faces a dilemma after Genghis Khan attempts to force him to lead the Mongol army to attack his native land. Although he was born and raised in Mongolia, he is unwilling to side with the Mongols to attack the Song Empire. 5<\/a><\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\u201cMoral rectitude\u201d is the first order of identification that could benefit Xi Jinping\u2019s image, particularly since he has been fighting corruption on many fronts since the fall of Bo Xilai. In this view, President Xi\u2019s pose consciously (or unconsciously) mirrors that of Guo Jing, depicted in these four cover photos. Xi Jinping cleverly positions himself as a symbol with which his pop culturally informed Chinese audience may identify. He is a Han national hero, like Guo Jing. What kind of identification is this?<\/p>\n

First consider the power of the pop culture icon. The degree of identification hinges on the cultural penetration of the image Guo Jing, whose character is propagated first through the popular novel, then by way of television and film adaptations, and finally by virtue of the stature of the novel\u2019s author, Jin Yong. For those Western readers not familiar with this dimension of Chinese culture, author Jin Yong and his character Guo Jing are comparable to J.K. Rowling and Harry Potter. Virtually everyone alive in the last two decades can conjure a picture of Harry Potter. Guo Jing\u2019s existence and cultural penetration are equally well established. Although Guo Jing\u2019s martial arts\/swordsman dimension might be more akin in Western terms to Alexandre Dumas\u2019 The Three Musketeers<\/em> and his protagonist d’Artagnan, the temporal immediacy of Harry Potter fits the pop culture analogy closer. So who is Guo Jing?<\/p>\n

As the story goes, he was raised in Mongol society, became the adopted son of Genghis Khan, the blood brother of the Khan’s son, and engaged to his daughter. Guo Jing is the kind of hero who is famous not merely for his martial ability, but also because his prime character virtues are uprightness, honesty, and loyalty. Throughout Jin Yong\u2019s narrative, Guo Jing relies on these virtues while negotiating difficult terrain in his coming of age, learning kung fu arts, falling in love with the clever Huang Rong, also of Han heritage (and breaking off his engagement with Khan\u2019s daughter), and eventually defending the Song against both the Jurchens \u5973\u771f\u4eba and the Mongols \u8499\u53e4\u4eba. Guo\u2019s upright, straightforward, hardworking, loyal nature simultaneously facilitates close fraternal (albeit adoptive) ties with the Mongol clan that raised him and ethnic allegiance to his Chinese roots. Eventually (it is a long story of 1,600 pages), Guo Jing defends the Song against foreign incursion, but maintains his integrity in all his relationships despite significant interior and exterior conflict.<\/p>\n

The novel The Eagle-Shooting Heroes was written in installments and serialized in the Hong Kong newspaper Hong Kong Commercial Daily \u9999\u6e2f\u5546\u5831 from 1957 to 1959, and its sequel was continued in Ming Pao \u660e\u5831, which was founded by Louis Cha (Zha Liangyong \u67e5\u826f\u955b). The author and newsman are one in the same \u2013\u00a0 Cha\u2019s pen name is Jin Yong. The first film version in Hong Kong was made in 1958, and later film adaptations were made in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. 6<\/a><\/sup> The 1983 TVB television adaptation, titled in English The Legend of the Condor Heroes,<\/em> was made in Hong Kong and starred Huang Rihua (Felix Wong) and Weng Meiling (Barbara Yung). It spanned 59 episodes, and was a social phenomenon at the time, garnering an incredible 99 percent viewership in Hong Kong, and was rebroadcast in 1985, 1990, 1995, 2012, and 2013 (in Taiwan). This adaptation continues to hold its own in pop cultural consciousness. 7<\/a><\/sup> Jin Yong\u2019s books were not available in Maoist mainland China, where politics tightly controlled cultural production, especially during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. The TVB production time frame of 1983 is coincidental with the early years \u2013 shortly after Deng Xiaoping opened up China to the outside world \u2013 which were characterized by the massive importation of \u201cGang-Tai (Hong Kong and Taiwanese) popular culture in the 1980s.” 8<\/a><\/sup> This \u201cpop culture craze” was specifically marked by a trio of cultural producers and their products: Jin Yong and Qiong Yao\u2019s novels and Deng Lijun’s songs. While Jin Yong had become enormously wealthy and influential as a Hong Kong newspaper publisher, his pop cultural impact was most deeply felt through serial publication of his 12 major novels, the revision and publication of those installments as books, and three collected works editions, as well as the multiple adaptations of each of his stories for television and film. He was so widely read in China that \u201cthe head of the National Publishing Bureau is reported to have told Jin Yong that in 1985 alone 40 million volumes of his fiction were sold in the Chinese mainland.” 9<\/a><\/sup> In fact, the breadth and penetration of Jin Yong\u2019s novels and characters in the cultural consciousness are so deep that there are a handful of other characters who are equally recognizable as Guo Jing to the Chinese readership.<\/p>\n

The 1983 adaptation of The Legend of the Condor Heroes<\/em> in 59 episodes is considered the definitive classic version by the generation of Chinese currently in their 50s and 60s, both inside and outside of China. This adaptation is listed variously as the ninth most popular TV series in the Chinese diaspora according to one source, 10<\/a><\/sup><\/a> as well as the number five television series in mainland China, with a viewership rate of 90 percent. 11<\/a><\/sup> Given that there have been four other major adaptations of this work, and a 2017 version is currently in production, it is not surprising that there is a stark generational difference in terms of which edition is preferred. This holds for the multiple adaptations of Jin Yong\u2019s other works, too. For example, my informal discussion with Chinese graduate students at Georgia Tech reveals that students in their late 20s favor more recent adaptations.<\/p>\n

Guo Jing is simple and plain, even slow as a child, but loyal, upright and honest. Hard work accounts for his attainments. In addition to archery, a skill at which Guo Jing excels, his martial prowess is famed. He learned kung fu moves through a lifetime of diligent practice from a wide variety of upright practitioners, including masters from a virtuous Daoist sect as well as the leader of the largest gang in the martial world, the Beggar Band. The photo of President Xi posing like the hero Guo Jing, may be read as a reference to both the President\u2019s forthright nature and his commitment as the defender of the nation. Here is the picture of a simple, but hard-working, upright and loyal hero, identifying with virtuous ideology (Daoist sect) as well as identification with the common people (Beggar Band), whose martial skills can protect the nation and whose diplomatic prowess as a leader can facilitate cooperation and harmony with China\u2019s external neighbors and domestic ethnic minorities.<\/p>\n

Unpacking the image is appropriately complex. Guo Jing straddles ethnic boundaries and belongs to both worlds. Indeed, the official media surrounding the China-Mongolia summit emphasized President Xi describing the closeness of the two nations using the expression, \u201ca visit in the style of calling on relatives\u201d (yici zouqinqi shi de fangwen<\/em>\u00a0 \u4e00\u6b21\u8d70\u4eb2\u621a\u5f0f\u7684\u8bbf\u95ee), noting that \u201ccalling on relatives\u201d is part of the \u201ccomprehensive strategic partnership relationship\u201d (quanmian zhanl\u00fce huoban guanxi<\/em> \u5168\u9762\u6218\u7565\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb) and deepening China-Mongolia friendship. 12<\/a><\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The archery image documents the closeness of the Sino-Mongolian relationship and echoes Guo Jing as friend and \u201crelative\u201d of the great Genghis Khan. Did President Xi understand the potential pop cultural significance of paying homage through a picture that imbues himself with Guo Jing\u2019s highly laudable virtues?<\/p>\n

Is there any indication that President Xi is, or could be, aware of such a connection? A search of official media does not reveal any mention of author Jin Yong or his novel and protagonist Guo Jing in relation to this state visit. However, there is evidence of President Xi\u2019s general consciousness of the novel at least. A Sina News article from May 26, 2015 is titled: \u201cThe Peach Blossom Island [depicted by] Jin Yong\u2019s Pen Attracts Uncle Xi\u2019s Visit, Where is It?” 13<\/a><\/sup> This article cites \u201cUncle Xi\u201d (Xi Dada<\/em> \u4e60\u5927\u5927) directly referring Peach Blossom Island, the childhood home of Guo Jing\u2019s sweetheart and eventual wife Huang Rong. Second, a February 27, 2016 article from China News titled \u201cDeng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping All Loved to Read Jin Yong\u201d cites that article and explains:<\/p>\n

Actually, among those who have in succession been China\u2019s leaders, many are fans of the books of the \u201cgreat martial knight\u201d Jin Yong, and Jin Yong also had intersections with many leaders. 14<\/a><\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This article was written in preparation for Jin Yong\u2019s 92nd<\/sup> birthday on March 10, 2016, and describes Deng Xiaoping\u2019s invitation to Jin Yong to visit in 1981, which \u201ccaused a sensation in Chinese society around the world\u201d [yinqi le quanqiu huaren shehui de hongdong<\/em> \u5f15\u8d77\u4e86\u5168\u7403\u534e\u4eba\u793e\u4f1a\u7684\u8f70\u52a8] and eventually led to unbanning his books. Subsequently, Jin Yong also met with leaders Hu Yaobang in 1984 and Jiang Zemin in 1993. Since the article doesn\u2019t mention current President Xi Jinping, beyond the Peach Blossom Island citation above, the title of the article may serve two purposes: first, to align President Xi with his predecessors, and second, to associate him with the eminent Jin Yong, who possesses cultural credentials of which any politicians could only dream.<\/p>\n

A century of Chinese leadership on the world stage, from Sun Yatsen to Chiang Kaishek, to Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, and up to the present, demonstrates the skill and aptitude of Chinese leaders over at least a hundred years and longer, if one includes the millennia of bureaucratic and educational dominance of China\u2019s elite. Furthermore, Shanghai was the business hub of Asia in the early 20th century and is well on its way to regaining that status; China\u2019s military leadership helped defeat the Japanese in World War II; some non-state-owned businesses survived even during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s; and of course the phenomenal rise of China as an industrial and export power over the last three decades. 15<\/a><\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

On the global stage, the \u201crise\u201d of China may be cast as a zero-sum gain, incurring the question whether \u201crising\u201d China implies \u201cfalling\u201d of other world powers, particularly the U.S. Is supplanting U.S. global leadership a prerequisite implied by the word \u201cleadership?\u201d Will China\u2019s growing economic and military competitiveness result in enhanced international political competitiveness? In my reading, President Xi\u2019s projection of the image of a Chinese leader situated to protect the nation from outside threats through his identification with Jin Yong\u2019s martial arts hero demonstrates Xi\u2019s cultural savvy: he identifies himself with the upright, honest, loyal defender of the Chinese people, and by extension, their domestic and international interests.<\/p>\n

This is soft (cultural) power subtly buttressing the president\u2019s image for the domestic audience. Is this is an astute appropriation of pop culture in service of the discourse of nationalism? It is hard to say definitively. Analyzing the archery picture closely, one might note the dignity and spirit of friendship between the two leaders and their wives participating in this activity. They actually look like they are having fun, and the series of photos that accompanies the activity appear to show the Mongolian president politely correcting President Xi\u2019s bow-handling, as the arrow will only fly true (for a right-handed person shooting Mongolian style) if it is mounted on the right side of the bow. President Xi will have a chance at hitting the \u201ceagle,\u201d so to speak, if he shoots \u201cright.\u201d<\/p>\n

Can savvy soft power symbolic acts prove useful on the world stage? Employing rap music to promote President Xi\u2019s signature objectives and the \u201cbrave archer\u201d trope may be seen as steps to engage the discourse of soft power, somewhat akin to the attempt to use the linguistic appellation \u201cUncle Xi\u201d to infer identification with the common folk. 16<\/a><\/sup> How this is received, especially outside China, is another matter. A Washington Post article by Emily Rauhala from September 23, 2015 discusses the use of video to promote the image of President Xi. This article is titled \u201cChina\u2019s President Xi is \u2018so cute,\u2019 says world\u2019s creepiest propaganda video.” 17<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0 The headline may not be fair to Xi Jinping and may indicate a lack of objectivity. Given that the word \u201cpropaganda\u201d is a pejorative in English, is it really necessary to use both the adjectives \u201ccreepiest\u201d and \u201cpropaganda\u201d in the same headline?<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the appellation \u201cUncle Xi\u201d used to refer to the President is a clear example of image management. Is it a coincidence, as one report puts it:<\/p>\n

He owes another portion of his popularity to his wife, a famous singer in China who adds to his popularity. One might not quite believe it, but the people like to call him “Uncle Xi\u201d? 18<\/a><\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

It is logical to think that the spouse of a famous singer with particularly close connections to pop culture may influence the production and management of her husband’s popular image. Appropriation of symbolism inherent in pictures like the \u201carchery photo\u201d could be helpful as small building blocks in solidifying Xi\u2019s domestic image.<\/p>\n

Many questions remain. Since both soft and hard power operate on cultural consciousness, can we prioritize one over the other? Could soft power prove \u201cstronger\u201d than hard military power through its influence over the audiences (think of a Hollywood analogy)? Will overt hard power of nationalism, military or business technocracy dominate the cultural and international discourse? China has many resources and experiences (read \u201ccompetitive advantages\u201d). And this brings us back to the photo of Xi Jinping shooting the arrow. Is his target, like Guo Jing’s eagle in Jin Yong\u2019s novel, a metaphor for the U.S.? As the second-largest economy on the global stage, China can make a case that its leadership position should be commensurate with its economic position? Will China attempt to displace the U.S. as the world’s leading superpower? Genghis Khan and his descendants established the largest global empire in history in the 13th<\/sup> Century, extending from China to Europe. How will a \u201ccomprehensive strategic partnership\u201d between China and its friends unfold in the 21st century?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Rap propaganda is the latest manifestation of Chinese President Xi Jinping\u2019s campaign to consolidate power using soft culture tropes to massage his image with audiences in China. 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