{"id":4019,"date":"2014-10-15T19:12:53","date_gmt":"2014-10-15T23:12:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/?p=4019"},"modified":"2023-04-07T11:23:56","modified_gmt":"2023-04-07T15:23:56","slug":"the-third-plenum-of-the-18th-ccp-central-committee-and-foreign-and-security-affairs","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/2014\/china-currents\/13-2\/the-third-plenum-of-the-18th-ccp-central-committee-and-foreign-and-security-affairs\/","title":{"rendered":"Foreign and Security Affairs in the Third Plenum"},"content":{"rendered":"

Stress on Internal Stability and National Security<\/strong><\/p>\n

The political direction outlined by the Third Plenum in November 2013 for China\u2019s international relations embodied a contradiction. It coupled a call for deepening integration of China\u2019s economy with the global economy with an intensified struggle against ideas carried into China by that very process of deepening globalization \u2014 ideas that are antithetical to the authority of the Chinese Communist Party and its monopoly on state power. To realize its and the Chinese people\u2019s aspiration of making China rich and strong, the CCP must open China to the world. But that very opening brings in powerful ideas of human liberty that have already toppled scores of undemocratic regimes in recent years. Xi Jinping’s and the Third Plenum\u2019s answer to this conundrum is rejection of political liberalization and intense ideological struggle among China\u2019s people against liberal democratic ideas, coupled with the judicious use of assertive nationalism to rally popular support for the CCP regime.<\/p>\n

The Communiqu\u00e9 issued by the Third Plenum affirmed the work of the Politburo since the previous Congress, work conducted, it said, \u201cin the face of extremely complex international circumstances.\u201d[i]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> The nature of those \u201cextremely complex international circumstances\u201d was not specified, but the stress of the Communiqu\u00e9 was on maintaining internal stability. The Plenum resolved to \u201csafeguard national security, guarantee that the people can live and work in peace and contentment, and that society is stable and orderly.\u201d The Communiqu\u00e9 also warned against marching \u201cthe evil road of changing banners and allegiances\u201d and falling from the path of \u201cSocialism with Chinese characteristics.\u201d This was an allusion to the Soviet experience and warning against political liberalization \u00e0 la loosening of the Party\u2019s control. To this end the Plenum decided to set up a National Security Commission and \u201cprefect national security system and a national security strategy to guarantee national security.\u201d It was imperative, the Plenum decided, to build strong armies for the Party, \u201cpeople\u2019s armies which listen to the Party\u2019s instructions, [and] can be victorious in battle.\u201d \u201cNew era\u201d military strategies and \u201cmodern military force[s] with Chinese characteristics\u201d were to be built.<\/p>\n

Xi Jinping elaborated on the nature of security threats during an explanation after the Plenum of the decision to set up a National Security Commission. China faced two security challenges, Xi said, which would be addressed via strengthened unified leadership of state security work to be provided by the new Commission. The first challenge involved the need to safeguard China\u2019s sovereignty, security, and \u201cdevelopment interests.\u201d The second involved the need to ensure domestic political security and social stability. [ii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Challenges to Sovereignty and Development Interests<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the several years leading up to the Third Plenum, challenges to China\u2019s \u201csovereignty\u201d came mainly from Japan in the East China Sea and Vietnam and the Philippines in the South Sea. Starting in 2010 an escalating cycle of Chinese and Japanese military assertion of presence around and over the Sengaka\/Diaoyu Islands and the disputed middle zone of the East Chinese Sea moved Chinese and Japanese military forces to an increasingly sharp confrontation that is, fortunately, still without firing. In 2010 the number of Chinese fishing boats entering the waters close to the disputed islands increased dramatically. Chinese boats also became less compliant with orders by Japanese coast guard ships to leave the area. In September one Chinese fishing boat, rather than leave the area as ordered by a Japanese coast guard ship, rammed the Japanese vessel. When Japan detained the offending captain, Beijing responded with a number of forceful moves, including severe restriction of export of Chinese rare earths to Japan. Large emotionally charged anti-Japanese demonstrations erupted in China, and Beijing catered to that opinion with strong moves.<\/p>\n

\"Garver<\/p>\n

When the Japanese government in September 2012 purchased several of the Sengakus still privately owned (reportedly as a way of preempting provocative actions there by freelancing Japanese nationalists) Beijing responded forcefully. China accelerated PLA-N operations in the seas around Japan, in effect warning Tokyo to desist from challenges to what Beijing deemed China\u2019s territorial sovereignty in the East China Sea.[iii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> Japan responded to China\u2019s moves with increased military moves of its own, and throughout 2013 Chinese and Japanese coast guard ships and aircraft confronted one another in the seas and airspace around and over the Sengakus. In the South Chinese Sea, Philippine and Vietnamese efforts to survey and exploit the energy resources under the sea floor were countered by PLA-Navy moves.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s \u201cdevelopmental interests\u201d requiring \u201cnew era\u201d military capabilities include evacuation of Chinese citizens (including Taiwanese, according to Beijing\u2019s policy) working abroad but finding themselves in conflict situations. China\u2019s first military operation to evacuate citizens endangered by internal disorder came in Libya during the uprising there in early 2011. More than 35,000 Chinese citizens were evacuated from Libya in a period of weeks, constituting the largest and most complicated evacuation of Chinese nationals up to that point. A PLA-N frigate on anti-piracy duty in the Gulf of Aden was dispatched to assist and safeguard the Chinese evacuation. The growing international presence of Chinese firms and personnel, combined with mounting instability in countries where Chinese firms operate, mean that Beijing called these rescue operations a major category of \u201cmilitary operations other than war.\u201d By conducting these operations effectively and professionally, Beijing demonstrates to its citizens that it protects China\u2019s interests and reputation as a strong country.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s most strategically vital \u201cdevelopmental interest\u201d involves the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) over which moves China\u2019s vast merchandise, energy, and raw materials trade. Broadly speaking, as China has globalized its economy, the SLOCs, which carry 90 percent of all world trade, have become more important to China.[iv]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> The implications of this are profound, ranging from rising ship insurance costs for vessels transiting the pirate-ridden Gulf of Aden, to the hypothetical ability of the United States Navy to blockade China in the contingency of a U.S.-PRC war that became protracted.[v]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 There is a huge gap between PLA-N requirements and capability to protect China\u2019s SLOCs.[vi]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s ability to defend these Chinese interests is linked to legitimization of the CCP regime and internal stability. Since the upheavals of 1989-1991, nationalism has become China\u2019s dominant popular ideology and de facto legitimization of the CCP regime. This requires that the regime demonstrate its ability to defend China\u2019s interests and honor. Having founded its claim to continued political tutelage on its ability to make China rich, strong, and esteemed among the nations of the world, the CCP cannot appear to be weak-kneed. Thus the Third Plenum Communiqu\u00e9 affirmed CCP rule since 1978 and proclaimed the objective for the future as \u201ccreat[ing] a wealthy, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious Socialist country, and realize the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.\u201d<\/p>\n

Enemies Within and Without<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the run-up to the Third Plenum, the CCP devoted considerable effort to ideological work aimed at unifying thinking. In May 2013 an internal document was issued by the Party\u2019s General Office for study by Party organs. The contents of the document leaked to the foreign media.[vii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> The secret study guide identified seven dangerous Western values that had to be struggled against as a matter of life and death. It was especially important to prevent communication of these dangerous ideas via the Internet.\u00a0\u00a0 The seven dangerous and subversive Western ideas were:[viii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Constitutional democracy<\/li>\n
  2. Universal human rights<\/li>\n
  3. Media independence (from Party guidance)<\/li>\n
  4. Judicial independence (from Party guidance)<\/li>\n
  5. Civil society (made up of autonomous organizations)<\/li>\n
  6. Pro-market neo-liberalism<\/li>\n
  7. \u201cNihilist\u201d criticism of past errors by the Party<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Xi Jinping reiterated in an \u201cimportant speech\u201d to a National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference convened in Beijing on August 19 (about a month before the Third Plenum), the importance of ideological class struggle against external and internal enemies. [ix]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> In effect, Xi was fleshing out the \u201cextremely complex international circumstances\u201d alluded to vaguely in the Third Plenum Communiqu\u00e9. Powerful foreign forces were conducting a propaganda campaign, especially via the Internet, but including all forms of media and communication, to create the ideological base for overthrow of the CCP regime, Xi said:<\/p>\n

    Hostile forces are doing their utmost to propagate so-called \u2018universal values\u2019 \u2026 their objective is \u2026 to overthrow the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and China\u2019s Socialist system. If we allow [this] \u2026 those false efforts will \u2026 endanger the Party\u2019s leadership and the security of the Socialist national regime\u2026 Western anti-China forces continue to vainly attempt to use the Internet to \u2018topple China\u2019 \u2026 On this battlefield of the Internet, whether we can stand up, and gain victory, directly relates to our country\u2019s ideological security and regime security.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

    The ideological class struggle was crucial. Alluding to the upheavals of 1989-1991 Xi continued:<\/p>\n

    History and reality have repeatedly proven that whenever or not ideological work is done well relates to the Party\u2019s future fate \u2026we cannot even for a moment slacken and weaken ideological work. In this area we have gained deep lessons. The disintegration of a regime often starts from the ideological area, political unrest and regime change may perhaps occur in a night \u2026 If the ideological defenses are breached, other defenses become very difficult to hold. We must grasp the leadership power \u2026 in ideological work closely in our hands \u2026 otherwise, we will make irredeemable historical mistakes.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

    \u201cWestern countries see our country\u2019s development and expansion as a challenge to their value views, systems, and models, and intensify ideological and cultural infiltration of our country,\u201d Xi said further. There were a range of \u201cmistaken viewpoints\u201d within China upon which the Western ideological offensive could build: embrace of Western values, discussion of party or national history, denial of reform or the Four Cardinal Principles. There were also \u201csocial contradictions and problems\u201d in Chinese society that were creating fertile soil for foreign hostile ideological subversion.<\/p>\n

    Xi Jinping\u2019s August 2013 \u201cimportant talk\u201d on ideological class struggle was followed by the release of a six-part, 100-minute video program titled \u201cSilent Contest.\u201d[x]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> Mandatory viewing for all CCP cadre above a certain level, the program apparently was produced by the General Staff Department of the PLA along with the PLA\u2019s National Defense University and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The program argued in detail that the U.S. defeated its greatest enemy, the Soviet Union, by non-military means, including especially ideological subversion, and was now trying to do the same thing with China. Gorbachev\u2019s \u201cNew Thinking\u201d that had erased Soviet Communist Party members\u2019 awareness of domestic and foreign class enemies and attempted \u201cwesternization\u201d that produced Soviet weakness, had all facilitated a sustained and long-term campaign of U.S. subversion. The result was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This resulted in the U.S. shifting its spearhead toward China. The years 1978-1989 had been a \u201choneymoon\u201d in U.S.-PRC relations because of common opposition to the Soviet Union. The United States was using a vast array of weapons to subvert China: radio and television broadcasts, cultural and academic exchanges, the Internet, support for Tibetan or Xinjiang rebels, and even the village election program of the Carter Center in Atlanta.<\/p>\n

    \u201cSilent Contest\u201d grew out of a decade-long debate in China over the cause of the Soviet disintegration. A leadership consensus was reached in 2004 that, in line with comments by Deng Xiaoping from 1989, a major reason for the Soviet collapse was the abandonment of core Marxist principles.[xi]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    Deep Internal Insecurity and Assertive Nationalism: Concluding Thoughts<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The efforts of the CCP to anathematize expression of doubts about Marxism-Leninism and the Four Cardinal Principles are linked to debates within China, and probably within the Party itself, about whether to undertake basic reform in China\u2019s political system. Discussion of that would, however, take this essay away from its proper focus on China\u2019s international relations. In terms of China\u2019s diplomacy, several conclusions follow from the previous discussion.<\/p>\n

    The deep insecurities of CCP leaders regarding domestic stability and legitimization will, first of all, lead Beijing to be careful to avoid genuine military conflict with its neighbors. In a conflict with Japan over a dispute in the East China Sea the PLA-N could well be defeated by the very high tech and very well-trained Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force. Chinese defeat in a naval clash with Japan would touch off anti-Japanese protests that could become very dangerous for the CCP. Hatred of Japan is easy to mobilize in China these days, but once anti-Japanese demonstrators are in the streets, it is extremely easy for popular anger to be directed against the government rather than against Japan. Under normal conditions Party authorities are able to turn down or off popular anti-Japanese fashions once they threaten state objectives.[xii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> But the spilling of Chinese blood by Japanese forces could well unleash a wave of emotion that overwhelmed controls that worked well enough during earlier upwellings of anti-Japanese emotion. In such circumstances, escalation into a larger scale clash with Japan might be deemed preferable to backing down. This could confront the CCP with a bigger war, with one of China\u2019s main economic partners that might derail the economy and\/or lead to a Chinese confrontation with the United States \u2014 with Japan at the U.S. side. On the other hand, assertive Chinese moves that generate tension but remain below the threshold of use of armed force, and which allow the CCP state to demonstrate its bold resolution in defense of China\u2019s interests, could be very attractive to China\u2019s rulers.<\/p>\n

    By defining liberal democratic ideas as \u201cWestern\u201d the CCP is better able to anathematize them as part of a hostile Western ideological attack on China. In the first instance it must be observed that the linkage of democracy with the West is bogus.\u00a0\u00a0 While many of these ideas did originate in Europe, they are today embraced by many non-Western countries: South Korea, Mongolia, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, Turkey, and so on. Scores of non-Western countries are struggling toward adoption of some variant of these universal ideas: Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Nepal, Egypt, the Ukraine, Tunisia, etc. Ideas of human liberty and democracy have spread across the globe. To call these ideas today \u201cWestern\u201d makes as much sense as to call science \u201cWestern.\u201d Yet in China, convincing China\u2019s people that these ideas are \u201cWestern\u201d goes a long way toward persuading them that they come from power centers hostile to China and are outside China\u2019s 4,000-year-old tradition.<\/p>\n

    The period between the spring 1989 internal challenge to the CCP regime and the collapse of the Soviet Communist state in December 1991 was pivotal. With old Marxist-Leninist ideas drained of popular appeal, the CCP state stood exposed as founded on naked brute power, unadorned by popularly appealing ideas. Confronted by this deep crisis of legitimacy, the CCP turned to aggrieved nationalism to rally popular support.\u00a0\u00a0 Ideological indoctrination and mobilization was one thing the CCP regime was still good at. Over the next two decades China\u2019s populace was intensively indoctrinated with the ideology of \u201cChina\u2019s century of national humiliation\u201d focusing on all the putative injustices inflicted on China when China was weak \u2014 i.e., before the CCP came to power. Expression of contrary ideas within China was repressed. The CCP\u2019s new ruling strategy was remarkably effective in re-legitimizing CCP rule, especially among China\u2019s more educated urban classes, a group that historically was attracted to ideas of nationalism. The turn-around from a deep legitimacy crisis in 1989 to strong nationalist support for the CCP regime today (as indicated by many opinion polls) is truly remarkable. And perhaps troubling. Lacking the legitimization of free popular election \u2014the immensely powerful legitimizing mechanism of modern liberal democracy \u2014 the CCP has appealed to nationalism.<\/p>\n

    The intense, popular nationalist belief fanned by decades of CCP indoctrination apparently has begun to exercise significant influence on China\u2019s foreign policy moves.\u00a0\u00a0 Forceful moves against putative foreign miscreants injuring China\u2019s interests or opposing China\u2019s unquestionably just \u201crise\u201d are popular, especially when directed against Japan, the number one villain of China\u2019s national humiliation narrative. The idea that \u201clittle countries\u201d like the Philippines or Vietnam should be allowed to trample on China\u2019s unquestionable territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea \u2014 which is how the CCP\u2019s ideological apparatus frames the issue \u2014 go down well with popular nationalist opinion.[xiii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> Moreover, attempts to settle territorial disputes with China\u2019s neighbors via negotiation not backed by demonstrations of China\u2019s now-great power and by concessions and compromise \u2014 as are perhaps inevitable in any negotiation \u2014 are decried as cowardly and na\u00efve, or perhaps downright treasonous. China\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more attuned to foreign views than other organs of China\u2019s government, has occasionally been criticized for lack of patriotic ardor.[xiv]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> A Chinese leader who aspires to high position, such as Xi Jinping, cannot afford to seem weak in rebuffing foreign transgressions.<\/p>\n

    The PLA officer corps may be a second constituency particularly enamored of<\/p>\n

    China\u2019s new aggrieved nationalism and favorable to forceful action to rebuff foreign offenses against China\u2019s honor or interests. Since the upheaval of 1989-1991, the CCP has paid special attention to indoctrination of the PLA, and China\u2019s soldiers are probably less exposed to challenges to the CCP\u2019s orthodox national humiliation narrative than are China\u2019s urban intellectuals. The PLA\u2019s budget and status are also linked to an active role in defense of China\u2019s interests. This is not to say that PLA leaders favor war, especially against countries allied with the United States. But the use of China\u2019s carefully cultivated and ever-greater military power in support of China\u2019s interests in ways short of war \u2014 i.e., in the sort of demonstrations in the vicinity of the Sengaku\u2019s in 2009-2014 \u2014 may well accord with PLA recommendations.<\/p>\n

    These hawkish forces in China are balanced by extremely powerful groups with vested interests in minimizing conflict with China\u2019s neighbors let alone with the United States. China\u2019s state-owned enterprises, private sector entrepreneurs and development-oriented provinces, plus broad swaths of China\u2019s slowly emerging civil society, are deeply interested in participation in the global economy and recognize that this would be hindered by international tension. CCP leaders also understand that it is they who will bear the possible risk of embarrassing defeat in foreign adventures, and\/or the potentially internally destabilizing aspects of economic losses associated with foreign conflicts. The international trajectory of China\u2019s rise is not ordained. Yet the question looms: how will an undemocratic and even anti-democratic but intensely nationalist China behave as its power waxes over coming years and decades?
    \n    <\/a>NOTES<\/p>\n

    [i]<\/sup><\/sup> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Communiqu\u00e9 of the Third Plenum of the 18th<\/sup> CCP Central Committee, (Full Text). http:\/\/www.c3sindia.org\/china-internal\/3787<\/a><\/p>\n

    [ii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Xi Jinping expounds security commission role, Xinhuanet<\/em>. November 15, 2013 http:\/\/news.xinhuanet.com\/english\/china\/2013-11\/15\/c_132892155.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

    [iii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 A detailed review of PLA-N activities in the seas around Japan is in Defense of Japan 2013, White Paper, Ministry of Defense, Japan. www.mod.go.jp<\/a>, Part 1: Security Environment Surrounding Japan, 41.<\/p>\n

    [iv]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 See, Rose George, Ninety Percent of Everything (<\/em>New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013).<\/p>\n

    [v]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 A major factor prompting Beijing to decide in late 2008 to deploy PLA-N warships to join in international anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden was the fact that Chinese companies were threatened with bankruptcy from escalating ship-insurance costs and disruption of delivery schedules because PRC ships needed to round the Cape of Good Hope rather than transit the Suez Canal.\u00a0\u00a0 See Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, No Substitute for Experience; Chinese anti-piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden (<\/em>Newport: China Maritime Studies Institute, China Maritime Studies monograph Number10, November 2013).<\/p>\n

    [vi]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 For a review of PLA-N anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and growing PLA-N attention to \u201cmilitary operations other than war,\u201d Erickson & Strange, Ibid.<\/p>\n

    [vii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Chris Buckley, \u201cChina Warns Officials against \u2018Dangerous\u2019 Western Values,\u201d The New York Times,<\/em> May 13, 2013; Chris Buckley, \u201cChina\u2019s New Leadership Takes hard Line in Secret Memo,\u201d The New York Times,<\/em> August 19, 2013.<\/p>\n

    [viii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Raymond Li, \u201cSeven Subjects Off Limits for Teaching, Chinese Universities Told,\u201d South China Morning Post,<\/em> September 19, 2013.<\/p>\n

    [ix]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u201cXi Jinping\u2019s 19 August speech revealed?\u201d (Translation), China Copyright and Media. http:\/\/chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com\/2013\/11\/12xi-jinpings<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 For a discussion of the authenticity of the leaked CCP document see Cary Huang and Keith Zhai, \u201cXi Jinping rallies party for propaganda war on internet,\u201d South China Morning Post<\/em>, September 4, 2013. http:\/\/www.scmp.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n

    [x]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Jeremy Page, \u201cChina Spins New Lesson From Soviet Fall,\u201d The Wall Street Journal,<\/em> December 11, 2013, 1.18; Jane Perlez, \u201cStrident Video by Chinese Military Casts U.S. as Menace,\u201d The New York Times<\/em>, October 31, 2013. The program was available on November 2013 at https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=m_81sjicoswb<\/a> but was later removed.<\/p>\n

    [xi]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Page, \u201cChina Spins New Lesson From Soviet Fall.\u201d<\/p>\n

    [xii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 For an insightful discussion of the relation between CCP authority and semi-autonomous nationalist activism see, James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State; the Rise of Public Opinion in China<\/em>\u2019s Japan Policy (<\/em>New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).<\/p>\n

    [xiii]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 One study found that a Google search of the Chinese media yielded 210,000 uses over a several year period of key three-phrase descriptions of putative Vietnamese and Philippine violations of China\u2019s sovereignty and resources in the South China Sea. Zheng Wang, \u201cBad Memories, Good Dream: the Legacy of Historical Memory and China\u2019s Foreign Policy,\u201d The Asan Forum <\/em>(July 25, 2014): 10, http:\/\/www.theasanforum.org<\/a><\/p>\n

    [xiv]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Jeff Bader, a key Obama China aide during his first term, recounts in his memoir the intimidation of less militant-minded voices in China\u2019s elite during the 2009-2010 debate.\u00a0\u00a0 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China<\/em>\u2019s Rise; An Insider<\/em>\u2019s Account of America<\/em>\u2019s Asia Strategy (<\/em>Washington: Brookings Institution, 2012, 109. 122. 104-05).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Stress on Internal Stability and National Security The political direction outlined by the Third Plenum in November 2013 for China\u2019s international relations embodied a contradiction. It coupled a call for…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":4110,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[705],"tags":[272,721,681,261,696,715,263],"topic":[1056,1058],"journal-year":[1074],"coauthors":[113],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nForeign and Security Affairs in the Third Plenum | China Research Center<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.chinacenter.net\/2014\/china_currents\/13-2\/the-third-plenum-of-the-18th-ccp-central-committee-and-foreign-and-security-affairs\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Foreign and Security Affairs in the Third Plenum | China Research Center\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Stress on Internal Stability and National Security The political direction outlined by the Third Plenum in November 2013 for China\u2019s international relations embodied a contradiction. 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