On June 29, New York-based Bloomberg news service stepped into unchartered political waters in China by reporting on the family wealth of Xi Jinping. According to public documents compiled by Bloomberg, as Xi climbed the Communist Party ranks, his extended family expanded their business interests to include minerals, real estate and mobile phone equipment. Those interests involved investments in companies with total assets of $376 million. They included an 18% indirect stake in a rare earths company with $1.73 billion in assets and a $20.2 million holding in a publicly traded technology company. The report said, \u201cThe figures don\u2019t account for liabilities, and thus don\u2019t reflect the family\u2019s net worth.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nAll eyes were on Xi Jinping and there was speculation that this \u201cforeign intervention\u201d might derail his ascension to the top. But Xi continued to appear in public and behaved like a man ready to take the reins in October. Then in early September, Xi suddenly disappeared. His scheduled meeting with United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on September 3 was canceled, and a Chinese Foreign Ministry official told upset American officials that Xi had sustained shoulder injuries. Xi also missed the scheduled meeting with the Danish prime minister on September 10, and no official explanation was given. This set off furious speculation on the Internet that either the physical or political health of the 59-year-old Xi was failing. A Chinese language website hosted in North America even put out an unverified report that there was an assassination attempt on Xi, and that He Guoqiang, a fellow member of the Politburo Standing Committee, also was wounded in a separate incident. The Chinese government kept silent until Xi resurfaced without prior announcement on September 20 when he visited China Agricultural University.<\/p>\n
Another bombshell dropped on October 30, 10 days before the 18th Congress was to open in Beijing. The New York Times reported that many relatives of Wen Jiabao, including his mother, son, daughter, younger brother, and brother-in-law, had become extraordinarily wealthy during his tenure in office. A review of corporate and regulatory records indicated that the prime minister\u2019s relatives \u2014 some of whom, including his wife, had a knack for aggressive deal-making \u2014 controlled assets worth at least $2.7 billion. Both the English and Chinese versions of the Times website were shut down in China hours after the report came out. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson declared that the report was false. Two U.S.-trained lawyers threatened to sue the paper. Overseas Chinese websites began to publish accounts that Wen\u2019s family was clean. However, there was no official rebuttal from Wen himself.<\/p>\n
The CCP nevertheless muddled through, and the 18th Congress opened and closed without any glitches. On November 15, the new members of the 18th Central Committee met and \u201celected\u201d the Politburo and Standing Committee. To the surprise of many, neither Li Yuanchao, former Minister of Organization, nor Wang Yang, Party Secretary of Guangdong Province, was placed in the Standing Committee. Both are known to be reform-oriented, and their failure to move into the top tier is indicative of the conservative nature of the new leadership. With the exception of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, the other five members of the Standing Committee — Zhang Dejiang (NPC), Yu Zhensheng (Chinese Political Consultative Conference), Liu Yunshan (Secretariat), Wang Qishan (Central Discipline Commission) and Zhang Gaoli (State Council) — all appeared to be handpicked by Jiang Zemin or his allies. A bigger surprise of the first plenary session of the 18th Congress was that Hu Jintao relinquished his chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, and then Xi was \u201celected\u201d to succeed him. Both Hu Chunhua (who will replace Wang Yang in Guangdong) and Sun Zhengcai (who already became the Party secretary of Chongqing) moved to the Politburo. Barring any unforeseen developments, in a decade, Hu and Sun will become China\u2019s top two leaders.<\/p>\n
Political writings on the wall<\/h4>\n Looking back at the rocky road to the 18th Party Congress, we offer some tentative observations on CCP politics in action. It is worth noting that this is just the second time in CCP history that a power transfer was peaceful and predictable. Despite fierce power struggle and factional rivalry, no attempt was made to challenge the pre-agreed setup that involved Xi becoming CCP general secretary and Li Keqiang being named premier. The next generation of the top leaders is also in the pipeline. It is unclear whether this so-called method of top leader chosen by the retiring leaders once removed (i.e. Hu Jintao chosen by Deng Xiaoping, Xi Jingping by Jiang Zemin, and Hu Chunhua by Hu Jintao) can be sustained. The best that can be said is that without real intra-Party competition for the top leadership, the current arrangement is a step-forward.<\/p>\n
It also is worth nothing that the unseemly convention of geriatric politics continues inside the CCP. Jiang Zemin demonstrated great influence in determining who was elevated to the Standing Committee. Li Peng was probably instrumental in eliminating reformer Li Yuanchao from the race to the top. Other retired leaders might have played roles in removing Ling Jihua, whose son was killed in the Ferrari crash, from contention for the Politburo. Li Changchun could have been the crucial factor in getting Liu Yunshan into the Standing Committee.<\/p>\n
That said, the era of political domination by elderly, retired leaders may slowly be coming to an end. Hu Jintao\u2019s inability to hang onto the Military Commission chairmanship signaled a repudiation of Jiang Zemin\u2019s ability to exercise power once the Congress had finished its work. Just a day after Xi Jinping replaced Jiang as the chairman of the military commission, he praised Hu Jintao as a person of high integrity and moral standards. This is tantamount to criticizing Jiang in a very serious manner because he insisted on retaining the military commission chairmanship when he stepped aside as president and Party general secretary. Despite Hu\u2019s inactivity on the political reform front, many hailed his last act \u2014 stepping down from the military commission \u2014 as the most memorable of his entire political career.<\/p>\n
The jockeying for power at the top in the months before the Congress highlights the reality that the CCP is rife with factional disputes and conflicts of interests. The fact that five of seven members of the Standing Committee will have to retire in 2017 is evidence that the final lineup was the result of compromise and concession. Just like any other political party, the CCP has to face the reality of political dissent and allow intra-party competition. Power-sharing and consensus-building through negotiation is the first step toward intra-Party democracy. It is safe to say that the day may come when factional fights within the CCP become a zero-sum game and can no longer be contained, resulting in a break into two or more political parties. Democracy could come to China, not through social movements but by by virtue of top-down politics.<\/p>\n
The days of non-interference in Chinese politics by foreign countries are gone now. The size of China\u2019s economy and its international influence do not permit non-intervention. Second, the increasing tendency by CCP factions to leak sensitive information to further their quests for power and to undercut their rivals has enabled both mainstream Western media outlets and online Chinese-language entities to publish reports that are not available inside China. As a result, Western media and think tanks have fully engaged the Chinese political process, despite the utter opacity and secrecy of the inner workings of the Party. Western reporting and analyses play a role in the final outcome of Chinese politics. I n addition, the growing popularity of weibo in China has magnified the impact of these information channels. On the one hand, the dynamics of Chinese politics has changed because of rapid and omnipotent distribution of information that has put secret holders on the defense. On the other hand, it has created new ways for Chinese citizens to engage in Party politics in a way that was never available to them before.<\/p>\n
Popular indifference inside China to official propaganda about the Congress coupled with intense interest in elections abroad also could be impetuses for political change in China. Organized efforts by the CCP to promote the spirit of the 18th Party Congress through publicity tours nationwide have remained a Party affair outside the life of ordinary Chinese citizens. In contrast, many Chinese people, including media outlets, spent a good deal of time reading, watching and thinking about power transfer through elections in countries such as Mexico, France, and the United States. These elections were fascinating and reminded the Chinese people what was lacking in their homeland.<\/p>\n
The future of political reform<\/h4>\n The need for movement on political reform is clear. For the CCP not to chart a new course in the wake of the Arab Spring, the Bo Xilai and Ling Jihua scandals, and the revelations of obscene amounts of wealth accumulated by the families of the top leader would be shocking to many reform-oriented scholars and political observers. Hu Wei, dean of the School of International Affairs and Public Administration, Shanghai Jiaotong University said China is facing a \u201cthree-D\u201d crisis: social decay, social disorder and social divide. Only one \u201cD\u201d\u2014 democracy \u2014 could overcome the three-D corrosion. Historian Zhang Lifan wrote, if we do not see reform in five years we will see collapse in ten years. Sun Liping, professor of sociology at the Tsinghua University, recently told a gathering of both Chinese and foreign financial workers, \u201cA silent revolution is taking place in China. The biggest force against reform in China is those who do not want to go back nor desire to move forward but to maintain the status quo. Reform and China will be like Taiwan. Without reform, China will be like the Qing dynasty.\u201d Li Weidong, former publisher of the China Reform Magazine, said in a \u201cTweet\u201d that the entire nation is daydreaming now and one of the new dreams is the so-called \u201cthree self-confidences.\u201d (In his political report, Hu Jintao talked of the CCP\u2019s unswerving endeavor to build socialism with Chinese characteristics and urged the Party to have self-confidence in roads chosen, theories adopted, and institutions established.) Li declared, \u201cNot only is this a pipe dream, it may soon engulf China in a nightmare.\u201d The most popular weibo nowadays is this: \u201cIntroducing reform means seeking death and not introducing reform means waiting to die.\u201d<\/p>\n
Where does Xi Jinping stand amid hope and frustration, expectation and anger? During his November 15 press appearance, Xi delivered a powerful pledge. He focused his messages on the nation, the people, and the Party. He spoke of the collective but not the individual; he advocated responsibilities but not rights; he called the Party to serve the people and change its work style, but there was little about institutionalizing accountability and transparency. He identified four cardinal problems the Party is facing: corruption, condescending, formalism, and bureaucracy. He said that unless the Party overcomes these challenges, it will not be able to lead the nation in building socialism with Chinese characteristics.<\/p>\n
In 2002, shortly after the 16th Party Congress, Hu Jintao took all members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo to Xibaipo in Hebei Province, where Mao and his comrades lived and worked before marching to Beijing and establishing the People\u2019s Republic. Hu vowed that the new leadership would call on all Party members to overcome arrogance, maintain integrity, and serve the people well. On November 29, Xi took \u201cthe magnificent seven\u201d to the National Museum to see \u201cThe Road to Rejuvenation,\u201d a Party history exhibition. He repeated everything he mentioned or alluded to in his November 15 speech. He talked about the destiny of the nation and the China Dream. He used three lines from the poems of Mao Zedong and ancient poet Li Bai to highlight China\u2019s humiliating past, its glorious opening up and reform, and its bright future. Again, the focus was on a mysterious and historical Chinese collective.<\/p>\n
To follow up his two speeches, on December 4, Xi convened a Politburo meeting that adopted a resolution to improve the work style and deepen the ties between the CCP and broad masses. Included were measures to cut Party circulars; reduce domestic inspection trips and foreign visits; prevent the blocking of roads when top leaders travel; eliminate profuse media reports; cut national meetings to only those absolutely necessary; stop publication of speeches; end the practice of traveling the country and writing inscriptions that become memorialized; and stop unnecessary meetings, ceremonies, and groundbreakings. Also in December, Xi made a trip to Guangdong. In Shenzhen, he placed a wreath in front of Deng Xiaoping\u2019s statue and vowed not to deviate from the road of reform and opening up, a policy that was put in place by Deng Xiaoping in late 1978.<\/p>\n
Xi\u2019s performance in the wake of the Congress is impressive, and has made it very clear to both the Chinese people and the outside world that he has no intention to deviate from the road chosen by Deng Xiaoping and his cohorts 34 years ago. What is a bit disappointing is that he has not delineated a clear vision on the issue of political reform. In his political report to the Congress, Hu Jintao solemnly declared that China will not take the old road of xenophobia and lack of innovation, nor will it take the deviant road of implementing any reform that weakens the Party\u2019s supremacy. There is no sign at this point that Xi Jinping will break away from this pledge.<\/p>\n
However, people still remember what Xi Jinping said in a speech at the Central Party School in 2010: \u201cThe Marxist view of power can be summarized in two sentences: \u2018power comes from the people\u2019 and \u2018power has to be used for the people.\u2019 The first sentence highlights the source and foundation of power, and the second informs us of the essence and destiny of the power. The sole mission of the CCP is to serve the people heart and soul. This is the difference between the Marxist view of power and capitalist view of power.\u201d The interpretation of this statement is that Xi may move forward with political reform, installing procedures through which the governed will offer their consent to the governing party. Even though Xi has great power because he is fully in charge of the Party and the military, he has not made any reference to his earlier statement that has inspired many in China.<\/p>\n
Some suggest waiting for the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Party Congress to see whether the Xi-Li Administration is serious about introducing meaningful political reform. It was during the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978 when Deng Xiaoping finally was able to marshal his political capital and move the Party from the narrow road of rigid ideology to the highway of pragmatic economic growth.<\/p>\n
China\u2019s growth dividends will expire soon. When they do, the CCP\u2019s legitimacy will face daunting challenges and fierce questioning. The extent of corruption, the loss of trust, the increasing unemployment of the young and educated, and the opacity of decision-making may all become the trigger of a Chinese Spring. Will China muddle through and sustain its economic growth without making significant social and political changes? If it does, the model touted in Beijing of sustained economic development and authoritarianism will get a boost and pose a serious challenge to the conventional wisdom that political accountability is necessary for long-term, economic prosperity and social harmony. If not, the entire world will watch as turmoil engulfs China and very possibly shakes up the global power balance and ushers in a period of instability.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
On November 14, 2012, after a week of listening, discussing and \u201celecting,\u201d the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) finally came to an end. The next day,…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":36,"featured_media":3304,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[197,198],"tags":[272,273,242,274,370],"topic":[1058],"journal-year":[1076],"coauthors":[137],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
The 18th Party Congress: A Turning Point in Chinese Politics? | China Research Center<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n